Tag Archives: U.S. Supreme Court

Slow And Steady Wins the Race

The Supreme Court will determine this Friday whether to grant certiorari in the Chaidez matter, the case in which the Seventh Circuit held that Padilla does not apply retroactively.  Presumably there is already a pool memo floating around the Court in which a clerk has made a recommendation as to whether cert. should be granted.  The Government has already made up its mind, however, having informed the Court that it agrees with the Petitioner (Chaidez) that cert. should be granted to resolve the Padilla retroactivity issue.

Aside from Chaidez, it will be interesting to see how many cert. petitions now pending before the Court will be “held” by the Court for “GVR” (grant, vacate and remand) treatment in light of its decision in Chaidez — assuming, of course, the Court does grant cert. on Friday.  It will also be interesting to see if Justice Kagan will have to recuse herself because, perhaps, she might have represented the Government back when the Padilla case was before the Court  (the Government filed an amicus brief in Padilla urging the Court to affirm the Supreme Court of Kentucky; yet another example of the current administration’s cramped and antagonistic view of immigrants’ rights ).  Should Justice Kagan have to recuse herself, there is a very real possibility that the Court may deadlock on the retroactivity issue, in which case the Seventh Circuit’s decision would be affirmed.  Not a good scenario for immigrants or their counsel.  The unlikely savior in such a situation may be the Chief Justice, however.  I say this only because the Chief Justice has indicated recently a discomfort with the Court’s rightward trajectory, not to mention the fact that he joined the majority in Vartelas, the Court’s recent decision which, in effect, limited the applicability of the draconian anti-immigrant legislation that is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546.

For those who are interested in reading the cert. materials in Chaidez, they are available here via the SCOTUS blog website.

2011 Year in Review

Thanks to those who visited Invisible Man in 2011.  I hope this blog has been of use to some.  The issue of Padila retroactivity, to which I have devoted a lot of my blogging, is still percolating throughout the courts and remains very much a hot topic among criminal defense and immigration law attorneys, especially those who toil in the trenches of postconviction litigation.  For 2012, I predict that the U.S. Supreme Court will finally step in to decide the issue of Padilla retroactivity, with a decision due in late 2012 or early 2013.  I believe the Court will find Padilla retroactively applicable (how could I predict otherwise?!) and Justice Kennedy will write the decision for the majority, although Justice Alito will, in one way or another, be key in shaping the contours of the Court’s ruling on Padilla retroactivity.

WordPress.com has provided me with a year end report for 2011, which I have posted below for everyone’s reference.

Thank you all again for taking time out to visit the Invisible Man.  I look forward to another year of blogging on Padilla and other issues.

********

The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2011 annual report for this blog.

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Sydney Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 9,400 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 3 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

Cert. Denied in Morris v. Virginia – UPDATED

Followers of Padilla retroactivity might be disappointed to hear that the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. today in Morris v. Virginia, the first case to present the question of whether Padilla qualified for retroactive application.  The decision denying cert. can be found on page 15 of the Court’s order list from 10/3/2011.

This ruling should come as no surprise, however.  The Virginia Supreme Court in Morris never really addressed the Padilla retroactivity question head on, if at all, and the issue is still percolating throughout the federal and state courts.

As to the latter, a helpful reader has informed me that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will soon rule on the Padilla retroactivity issue.  The case is United States v. Marisella Carmen-Iglesias (Case No. 11-12316) from the Southern District of Florida.  I will post the briefs and provide updates as they become available.

UPDATE: the “helpful reader” who alerted me to the Carmen-Iglesias case in the Eleventh Circuit was nice enough to send me the appellate briefs.  The Government’s brief can be found here, the appellant’s/defendant’s here.

Equal Justice Under Law

Photo courtesy of the Brennan Center for Justice

I recently finished reading the biography of Justice William Brennan, considered one of the most influential jurists in United States Supreme Court history.   Brennan is perhaps best known as the liberal bulwark of the Court in a tenure that spanned the reign of three Chief Justices, Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist.

It is no surprise that Brennan’s liberal leanings, exhibited most prominently in his rulings from the Court, made Brennan a much-reviled figure among conservatives, who disliked him as much for his views as for his success in turning those views into law.  These critics complained that Brennan acted beyond his authority as a judge whose role it is to simply apply the law, not make it.  Instead, the criticism goes, Brennan would act as kind of a super-legislature, grafting his personal views of morality and human dignity into his judicial opinions.

Whether these accusations have any basis in fact is perhaps open to dispute.  To be sure, Brennan cannot be considered a judge whose ultimate fidelity lies in the words of a statute instead of in his convictions of right and wrong.  With a properly framed question, Brennan, I am sure, would have admitted as much if he were still alive.  Indeed, a popular story of Brennan’s tenure as Supreme Court justice is that he would invariably ask his clerks who have just come on board for a new term what the most important rule is when it comes to judging on the Supreme Court.  After fielding incorrect answers like “due process” or “equal protection” he would raise up five fingers and say that the most important rule in the Court is to attain votes from five justices in a case, which constitutes a majority on the Court.  Activist? Perhaps.  Result-driven?  Maybe so.

But focusing on such mechanisms of judicial rulemaking do nothing to advance the debate of what we consider to be a model society that is governed by the rule of law rather than one that is run by the whim of the individual.  As Brennan’s “rule of five” vignette demonstrates, judging necessarily involves the employment of policy preferences; after all, if judging was as simple and straightforward as applying the law to the facts, as is the myth most prominently trumpeted perhaps by Chief Justice Roberts (his judge as umpire calling balls and strikes analogy comes to mind), why aren’t all cases before the Court decided on a unanimous basis? And this is true whether the judge is considering the case of a derelict landlord who fails to fix a tenant’s leaky faucet or one involving more weighty constitutional issues like whether the government can prohibit flag-burning consistent with the First Amendment (it cannot).  There are exceptions to this phenomenon, of course, but the simple truth is that judges are most of the time lawmakers, only in different garb.

I would argue that the sooner we recognize and accept this, the sooner we can move on to more substantive discussions as to which judge-made laws, and the principles which underlie them, are more consistent with what we view as a just and equal society.  Fortunately, Brennan got past this a long time ago and, as a consequence, achieved unparalleled success in changing the direction of this country through his rulings, one that sought to recognize and protect the dignity of the individual above all else.

Padilla Going Retro?

The National Immigration Project of the National Lawyer’s Guild has recently issued a Practice Advisory on the retroactive applicability of Padilla v. Kentucky.  It concludes that Padilla should be applied retroactively by the lower courts because it does NOT create a new rule of criminal constitutional law.  The practice advisory can be downloaded here.

Also, a recent decision from Judge Seybert in the Eastern District of New York touches upon but does not decide the issue of retroactive applicability of Padilla — she assumes for the sake of argument that it does apply retroactively and then goes on to reject his Padilla claim on the merits.  The case is United States v. Obonaga (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2010) and can be accessed via Google Scholar here.

Justice Stevens’ Last Hurrah (Maybe)

Last week the U.S. Supreme Court  handed down a significant decision in Padilla v. Kentucky written by Justice Stevens, which held that  criminal defense attorneys must now advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.  Prior to this ruling, most state and federal courts scoffed at such a requirement, chastising counsel only when he or she misadvised a client about whether the risk of deportation posed by a conviction.  One upshot of those decisions was the encouragement of counsel, particularly the uncaring and lackadaisical ones, to remain silent when it came to the point of a case where the worlds of criminal procedure and immigration law intersected.  After Padilla, that will no longer be the case.  And, it is, of course, too early to tell whether the post-Padilla regime will result in better representation for clients.

What I am puzzled about is whether the rule announced in Padilla will have any retroactive effect as to convictions that became final after the Court decided Padilla, particularly in postconviction/collateral proceedings.  An initial review of Justice O’Connor’s seminal decision in Teague v. Lane brings me to the conclusion that Padilla could NOT be applied retroactively even with reference to Justice Harlan’s “ordered liberty” exception, i.e., that the rule announced in Padilla would be “the kind of absolute prerequisite to[a trial's] fundamental fairness that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” “

For those postconviction/criminal procedure gurus who may happen to stumble across this blog entry, I would greatly appreciate your collective thoughts on this issue.

The Morally Ambivalent Justice

Ronald Dworkin has a great piece in this week’s New York Review of Books on the Sotomayor confirmation hearings.  In it he criticizes the modern myth that judges are only supposed to apply the law rather than make “controversial judgements of political morality” – a point that I have made in the past.

Here is an excerpt from the article:

Sadly, practically everyone concerned in judicial confirmation hearings—senators and nominees—has an overriding interest in embracing the myth that judges’ own political principles are irrelevant. Sotomayor was, of course, well advised to embrace that myth. Her initial statement, and her constant repetition of it, made her confirmation absolutely certain; she could lose the great prize only by a candor she had no reason to display. She was faced by a group of Republican senators who had no interest in exploring genuine constitutional issues but wanted only to score political points, if possible by embarrassing her but in any case to preen before their constituents. They scoured her record of extrajudicial speeches for any sign that she actually doubts the myth so they could declare her a hypocrite who is not faithful to the law after all.

Democratic senators had no wish to challenge the myth either. They only wanted to protect her from questions that might supply ammunition to her opponents, so they offered her endless opportunities to repeat her empty promise to follow the law. Only President Obama, in a remarkably candid statement, seemed to challenge the myth. The law, he said, decides 95 percent of the cases but that leaves 5 percent to be decided in the judge’s “heart.” Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona asked Sotomayor if she agreed with Obama on this point. No, she roundly declared, I do not.

So the minuet was choreographed, and any illumination ruled out, before the hearings began. Both supporting and opposition senators asked Sotomayor whether she approved of recent Supreme Court decisions they believe of particular concern to their constituents: about abortion, of course, but also gun control, the president’s power to defy Congress, his power to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely, and the permissibility of a city taking private property for private development. They wanted to be seen as knowledgeable and concerned by what worried voters.

You can find the entire article here.

“The Machinery of Death” in Georgia and Beyond

Over the past week, the death penalty has received considerable media coverage here and across the nation.

First came news that the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council had asked Fulton County to repay the State of Georgia for fees and expenses that were incurred in defending Brian Nichols, the escaped prisoner who went on a murderous rampage in downtown Atlanta, killing a judge, among other public officials.  This comes on the heels of a recent, somewhat critical report in the AJC of the growing cost of Nichol’s legal defense, which I wrote about here.  At the same time, according to the AJC, the State has crafted plans to cut the budget for funding public defenders in Georgia, which could result in furloughs of a month or more.

Over at the Times is a story on the growing number of judges who are writing dissents that are critical of the death penalty and the manner in which it is being imposed.  Here is an excerpt from that article:

In dozens of capital cases in recent years, appeals court judges, some of whom have ruled in favor of the death penalty many times, have complained that Congress and the Supreme Court have raised daunting barriers for death row prisoners to appeal their convictions, and in many cases the judges have taken on their colleagues.

“There is an increasing frustration among federal judges throughout the system,” said Eric M. Freedman, a critic of the death penalty who teaches on the subject at Hofstra Law School.

Mr. Freedman predicted that the level of dissatisfaction would increase. “Judges are likely to have less and less patience for being hogtied by legalistic mumbo-jumbo,” he said, “which prevents them from reaching fair results.”

The law that generates much of the judges’ ire is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Since its passage, the act has been cited in a half-dozen to two dozen dissents a year, often in language forceful enough to rival Judge Fletcher’s. The law, championed by legislators who believed prisoners were abusing the federal appeals process, restricts federal court review of state court decisions in death penalty cases and puts strong limits on the ability of condemned prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions to get their cases reconsidered.

The full story is available here.

And today comes news that the Supreme Court has essentially given a reprieve to Troy Davis, who is on death row in Georgia after having been convicted of killing an off-duty police officer.  In an unsigned one-paragraph order, the Supreme Court sent Davis’ case back to the trial court and instructed it to conduct a factual hearing to determine “whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes [Davis'] innocence.”  The order was met with a dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas), in which he says, among other things, that the trial court was being sent on a “fool’s errand.”  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, countered with their own take on the law, stating that “[t]he substantial risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an evidentiary hearing.”

Liptak of The Times has the story here, the AJC, here, and SCOTUS blog, here.

Finally, yesterday saw the start of the trial of Sharon Keller, the Texas judge who is accused of having intentionally denied a death row inmate access to the courts.  For those of you who are unfamiliar with the case, here are the basic facts, as per the Times:

On Sept. 25, 2007, Judge Keller put in a 10-hour workday and went home around 4 p.m. to meet a repairman. That morning the United States Supreme Court had effectively suspended lethal injection as a manner of execution by accepting a challenge to its constitutionality in a Kentucky case.

Largely on the basis of the justices’ action, lawyers for a Texas death row inmate were putting together an appeal to stave off execution. An assigned duty judge was waiting at the courthouse for any last-minute appeal on the inmate’s behalf.

Around 4:45 p.m., the general counsel of Judge Keller’s court called her to relate a request to file paperwork after 5 p.m., the usual closing time for the court clerk’s office. Judge Keller replied that the clerk’s office closed at 5 p.m. A few hours later, the inmate was executed.

The full story is here.  Grits for Breakfast provides coverage of the Keller case, links, and some interesting commentary here.

My thoughts on these stories and the general death penalty brouhaha is as follows:

(1) Like most of the hot button issues, those in power who are in a position to effect change (politicians, judges, lawyers, journalists), even those who are opposed to capital punishment, are not likely to take action.  Why?  Because it’s another issue that can be, and has been, used to divide the masses, generate controversy, etc., which, in turn, means these individuals get to maintain their positions of power.

(2) The notion that judges must and do slavishly follow and apply the law is a false one.  The corollary being that there is a moral component to the law.  Is there any other reason why we consistently refer to the Supreme Court as having a liberal and a conservative wing?   Anyone who tells you differently is being disingenuous at best and manipulative at worst.

(3) Criminal defendants and their attorneys are shafted on a regularly basis by everyone and anyone who cannot fathom the reason why people commit crimes in the first place.  Hint: it’s rarely if ever because that person is predisposed to committing criminal acts.

- AW

You Have the Right To Remain Silent, You Have the Right to … Wait, Hold that Thought

The Tampa Tribune picked up a story of a memorandum recently circulated within the Tampa Police Department that provides guidelines for officers looking to skirt the protections of Miranda v. Arizona and its familiar set of warnings.  Opponents of the new policy have blasted the Tampa PD, calling it a recipe for violating constitutional rights, while the police describe it as a necessary tool to aid in the investigation of crimes.  In case  you’re wondering, here are some of the suggestions offered in the memorandum as to how police could seek to elicit incriminating statements, Miranda or no Miranda:

•The Miranda warnings must be given at the outset.

•There must have been a sufficient lapse of time between the invocation of the right to remain silent and the resumption of questioning; two hours is enough, perhaps less.

•The second round of questioning should be at a different location/setting.

•The second round of questioning must concern different crime(s).

According to the story, the memo was written in response to a recent Supreme Court decision, which was not named but is mostly likely the one in Kansas v. Ventris.  In Ventris, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution may use statements elicited by the police from a defendant for impeachment purposes, i.e., to undermine his credibility ever after the defendant he has invoked his right to counsel.  Scott Greenfield over at Simple Justice had a nice take on the decision which it was first issued.

I am doubtful the new policy being implemented by the Tampa police will actually result in more closed cases.  Such legally dubious tactics rarely do.  What I am fairly certain of, however, is that Tampa defense attorneys will challenge police-initiated interrogations, and the resulting statements, with more frequency, which, in turn, will lead to more litigation and longer delays for criminal defendants looking to have their cases resolved.

Souter: Can We Have a Do-Over, Please?

The Times’ Adam Liptak continues his exceptional reporting with a column today on the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal v. Hasty.  Here is an excerpt:

The Iqbal decision now requires plaintiffs to come forward with concrete facts at the outset, and it instructs lower court judges to dismiss lawsuits that strike them as implausible.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the five-justice majority, “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Note those words: Plausible. Common sense.

The old world was mechanical. A lawsuit that mouthed the required words was off and running. As the Supreme Court said in 1957 in Conley v. Gibson, a lawsuit should be allowed to go forward “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Things started to change two years ago, when the Supreme Court found a complaint in an antitrust suit implausible.

In the new world, after Iqbal, a lawsuit has to satisfy a skeptical judicial gatekeeper.

“It obviously licenses highly subjective judgments,” said Stephen B. Burbank, an authority on civil procedure at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. “This is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases they disfavor.”

Liptak also quotes Justice Souter dissenting from the majority’s decision in Iqbal.  What he does not mention, however, is that Souter had authored the opinion that really gave birth to this new “plausibility” standard: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.  Whether Souter envisioned when writing Twombly that his opinion would one day be interpreted by his colleagues to impose an even stricter standard of pleading and thus make it harder for plaintiffs to have their claims heard by a jury will probably remain a mystery.  There is little doubt, however, that Souter was kicking himself in Iqbal for having had a hand in that process.

The full story can be found here.