Seventh and Tenth Circuits Rule on Padilla Retroactivity

I apologize again for the delay in posting.  Things have been hectic around here, both work-wise and life-wise.  For those of you who follow developments with Padilla retroactivity, this is probably old news.  But the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have recently issued opinions holding that Padilla cannot be applied retroactively.  Notably, the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Gotschall’s groundbreaking decision in Chaidez which has been covered extensively in this blog.  (See posts here and here.)  The case from the Tenth Circuit is United States v. Chang Hong (Case No. 10-6294) and was an appeal from a denial of a 2255 habeas petition.  Of note in Hong is that the petitioner there argued that Padilla is a new rule so he could extend the statute of limitations for his habeas claim; his petition was otherwise untimely.

I will have more to say about both decisions soon.  Meanwhile, the opinion in Chaidez (including a persuasive dissent) is here, the one in Hong, here.

Meanwhile, it will be interesting to see how these rulings will affect the application for writ of certiorari in Morris (post here) that is currently pending in the Supreme Court on Padilla retroactivity.  Will anyone of the losing parties in Chaidez and Hong also appeal to the Supreme Court?  If so, which case presents the more ideal vehicle for (a) getting cert granted and (b) reversing the appellate decision on Padilla retroactivity?

Returning the Favor

Over at my law practice, I get a lot of inquiries about expungements.  Most if not all of the persons who ask about expungements do so because their criminal convictions have prevented them from applying for or maintaining a job.  Unfortunately, there is only so much a lawyer like myself can do in these situations; you either qualify for an expungement or you don’t.  There is rarely ever any gray area in seeking an expungement where the advocacy of an attorney would make a difference.  There are exceptions of this, of course, but they are few and far between.

These inquiries, and there are a lot of them, bring to fore the more sobering and practical aspects of a criminal conviction, and, in some cases, a past arrest.  The value and importance of employment cannot be overstated, especially for those who are looking to re-establish themselves in the free world after having been removed from it for some time.  It’s necessary from a day-to-day, pay the bills, perspective.  But it’s also important for one’s spirit and psychological well-being.

So when a prospective employer rejects a job application because the applicant has a prior criminal record, he or she is also sending a message: you may have served your time and paid your debt to society, but you are still unwelcome here. What, it might be asked, should an ex-inmate make of such a message?  On the first few occasions, not much.  He or she would probably hope for a better more humane reception from a different audience.  However, when it gets to the fifth or sixth time the welcome mat is pulled from underneath one’s feet, the feelings of despair and hopelessness start to kick in.  This leads almost inevitably to the place from where the inmate first started: jail.

On July 26th, the EEOC convened a public meeting on this very subject.  The testimony of the panelists and a complete video of the meeting can be found here.  I conclude this post by quoting  from the testimony of one of the panelists, Michael Curtin, the head of D.C. Central Kitchen, an organization, which, according to its website, “turns leftover food into millions of meals for thousands of at-risk individuals while offering nationally recognized culinary job training to once homeless and hungry adults”:

Let me finish by telling you about just one of our graduates, Dawain Arrington.

I’d like to tell you briefly about one of our graduates who spent over 17 years of his life in prison – starting when he was 11, living in SE, and was locked up for stealing food to feed his brothers while his dad was locked up for dealing drugs and his mom, a drug abuser, was out on a bender. This started a tragic but very predictable spiral into drugs, violence and gangs that landed him in jail again for what was supposed to be a 35 year sentence.

During that last stay, he realized that he couldn’t continue this lifestyle. He did exactly what we told him to. He got his GED, he got a dry wall certificate, a welding certificate and a masonry certificate. With a great deal of luck, he was released after 13 years thinking he would now be able to start over. The only thing he did for two months was apply for posted jobs requiring the skills he had learned in prison. The only thing he got was doors slammed in his face because of his record.

He told his case worker that he might as well send him back to prison now because without a job and with no prospects, he would have to turn to the life he knew that would either see him dead or back in prison. Instead, that case worker sent him to DC Central Kitchen. Now, this is not intended to be a commercial for DC Central Kitchen. He just happened to come to us because we had recruited at his halfway house and that case worker knew about our program.

Dawain wasn’t a model student from day one, but he got himself into shape and did an excellent job. We had an opening in our catering department when he graduated in 2005, and we hired him. He has been with us ever since and is now a supervisor in charge of putting out the 4800 meals we produce for the City’s shelters, half-way houses, transitional homes and other social service programs in our community. He also now has a daughter who will never have the expectation he did when he was eleven years of old: “If I live to be 21, which I probably won’t, I’ll be in prison.”

That is what a job can do. As a community, we’ve spent close to a million dollars keeping Dawain locked up. Don’t get me wrong – he did some bad things and deserved to be locked up. The chances are very good that if had not come to the Kitchen and not gotten a job, he would be costing us all money today. Instead he is putting money into our economy, helping others while he’s doing that and, perhaps most importantly, changing the expectations of the next generation and those to follow. Saving us all millions along the way.

I realize that talking about victories 15, 20, 30 years down the road is tough to calculate and maybe even harder to sell politically. The beauty of it is, it starts paying today and keeps paying well beyond tomorrow.

As I said, I have been in the hospitality business for over two decades. I can say with confidence that I have never felt more confident of and comfortable with any staff I have ever had than the staff we have at DC Central Kitchen. While we are certainly not without our issues, I trust this staff and depend on them. I honestly feel that the men and women working at the Kitchen not only see a higher purpose in our work, but they understand the value of the job. On many occasions, I have been told by members of our team that this job not only saved their lives but is the one thing that is keeping them from going back to prison or winding up dead on the streets.

I am honored and grateful to be able to be here today and I would ask the EEOC to use its authority and help remove the barriers to employment that ex-offenders face not just because it is the right or the good thing to do but because it is also the smart thing to do. Every single day I see people who have committed to changing their lives and the lives of their families. The only thing we are asking is that these individuals are given a fighting chance and are not blindly discriminated against because of mistakes they have made in the past.

 

 

Padilla Retroactivity in SCOTUS?

A few months ago, I wrote about the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Morris, limiting the procedural vehicles from which a defendant could launch a postconviction challenge under Padilla.  This decision generated some controversy after lower court judges refused to abide by the Morris court’s ruling and continued to entertain Padilla claims raised in the rather esoteric motions that were at issue in Morris.

Thanks to the SCOTUS blog, we have learned that Morris has appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The questions presented are as follows:

(1) Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively to ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised on collateral review; and

(2) whether Virginia provides adequate postconviction remedies when petitioner and others similarly situated are precluded from vindicating violations of the right to effective assistance of counsel under Padilla.

Morris (the petitioner) is being represented by the law firm, Duane Morris.  The petition can be accessed here.  I will post Virginia’s response as it becomes available.

Padilla Odds and Ends

A picture from my travels. Can you guess where I was?

My apologies for the delay in posts.  I have been traveling and have only recently returned to good ‘ol Atlanta.  Here are a few noteworthy court rulings on Padilla:

  •   The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held in Commonwealth v. Clarke, Case No. SJC10888 (June 17, 2011) that Padilla announced an “old rule” and can therefore be applied retroactively.  The Clarke court’s retroactivity analysis mirrored that of the Third Circuit’s in Orocio, which also found Padilla retroactively applicable, and it put to bed the notion that simply because a court applies Strickland to a new set of facts does not mean that a “new rule” has been created for retroactivity purposes.  This is so even if courts disagree on how Strickland applies in these novel factual circumstances.  The opinion in Clarke is available here.
  • The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals might soon be deciding whether the Padilla retroactivity question.  In Ivan Dejesus Chapa v. United States, Case No. 10-CV-1885 (N.D. Ga. June 14, 2011), Magistrate Judge Braverman issued an order recommending the denial of Chapa’s section 2255 habeas petition.  The petition itself raised issues of ineffective assistance under Padilla.  Magistrate Judge Braverman was not convinced, however, and found the petition meritless on retroactivity (Padilla is a new rule and therefore cannot be applied retroactively) and ineffective assistance of counsel (Chapa’s claim fails under pre-Padilla caselaw) grounds [rulings later adopted by the district judge in the case].  A certificate of appealibility was issued to Chapa, however, allowing him to address the issue of Padilla retroactivity to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Judge Braverman’s report and recommendation is available here.

Additional Thoughts on Orocio

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals might be the first federal appellate court to rule on Padilla retroactivity but it certainly won’t be the last.  Indeed, as of this writing, the Government has sought a re-hearing, en banc, in Orocio, a request that will likely be granted, considering the import of the issues.  Here are some of my thoughts/observations on the case:

(1) The facts in Orocio were almost identical to those in Padilla (longtime lawful permanent resident; relatively minor drug charge) which apparently helped in persuading the Third Circuit to rule in Orocio’s favor.

(2) The postconviction vehicle of choice was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis; here, the defendant would have been out of time were he to file a 2255 habeas petition.  The court didn’t address any procedural issues related to this since the lower court had not done so.

(3) In deciding that Padilla announced an “old rule” and could therefore be applied retroactively, the Third Court looked simply to Strickland’s threshold standard of reasonableness, which, the Supreme Court has ruled, applies in the plea context.  According to the Third Circuit then “[f]ar from extending the Strickland rule into uncharted, Padilla reaffirmed defense counsel’s obligations to the criminal defendant during the plea process, a critical stage in the proceedings.”  And just because the Strickland standard is successfully applied to a new factual circumstance does not necessarily mean that it creates a “new rule” for retroactivity purposes — this is especially the case when the claim involves a “rule of general applicability” which was the product of the Strickland case.

(4) The Third Circuit overruled prior precent in finding that the petitioner made out a prima facie case for Strickland prejudice.  Thus, defendant’s no longer have to show so-called factual innocence; instead,  a defendant need only show that it would have been rational for him to reject the plea and proceed to trial, which appears to be a less onerous standard.  Under the reasoning of the Orocio court, in cases where deportation is a potential consequence of one’s plea-based conviction, it is almost always rational for a defendant to reject a plea and proceed to trial.  But that’s just my reading of the decision.

I post here the Third Circuit’s official opinion in Orocio.  The Government’s brief is here, the Appellant’s, here.  The Appellant’s reply brief is here.

Federal Appellate Court Rules that Padilla Can Be Applied Retroactively

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held in United States v. Orocio that Padilla announced an “old rule” and can therefore be applied retroactively.  Although this was a 2-1 decision, the dissenting judge only took issue with the majority’s Strickland prejudice analysis.

In ruling that Padilla announced an “old rule” the Orocio court focused on Strickland’s bedrock standard of “reasonableness” under the circumstances.  It matters not then that Strickland would eventually be applied to potentially novel factual circumstances.  What matters is that the reviewing court looked to the reasonableness standard in determining whether there was a viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Padilla.

The decision can be downloaded here.

April Showers Bring May Flowers*

[*I have been informed by my ever helpful wife that we are in June; I will neither admit nor deny whether I knew this at the time I thought of this title but point out that the decisions at issue in this blog post were issued in May!]

The once prevailing wind of hostility by federal judges toward Padilla retroactivity claims has now begun to blow the other way.  Two federal district courts recently held that Padilla did not announce a “new rule” for retroactivity purposes, i.e., Padilla could be applied retroactively, and granted, yes granted, the petitioners in those cases postconviction relief.

The cases are United States v. Krboyan, decided in the Eastern District of California, and Amer v. United States, a Northern District of Mississippi matter.  It is notable that each case involved different procedural vehicles for seeking postconviction relief; in Krboyan, it was a petition for writ of error coram nobis, in Amer, a section 2255 habeas petition [although the court, in a move of great significance, sua sponte converted this into a petition for writ of error coram nobis thereby obviating the need for the petitioner to argue that his otherwise untimely 2255 petition fell within section 2255(f)(3)'s "new rule" exception, otherwise know as the death knell for Padilla retroactivity.  Also notable is the fact that the holdings originated in two pretty different circuits, in terms of the general ideological sweep of decisions which affect criminal procedure and immigration: Ninth Circuit versus Fifth Circuit.

The Krboyan case can be downloaded here, Amer, here.

In other Padilla retroactivity news, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently accepted a case with potentially profound impact on Padilla retroactivity law.  The case is State v. Frensel Gaitan, which was previously covered in this blog here.  The question to be answered, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court website, is as follows:

Do the decisions in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) and State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009) apply to this non-citizen defendant’s argument, raised for the first time in his post-conviction relief petition, that his attorney failed to discuss with him the deportation consequences of his guilty plea?

If anyone has access to the briefs in the Gaitan case [as they become available] and would be willing to share them with other readers, please let me know.