Category Archives: U.S. Supreme Court

Cert. Denied in Morris v. Virginia – UPDATED

Followers of Padilla retroactivity might be disappointed to hear that the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. today in Morris v. Virginia, the first case to present the question of whether Padilla qualified for retroactive application.  The decision denying cert. can be found on page 15 of the Court’s order list from 10/3/2011.

This ruling should come as no surprise, however.  The Virginia Supreme Court in Morris never really addressed the Padilla retroactivity question head on, if at all, and the issue is still percolating throughout the federal and state courts.

As to the latter, a helpful reader has informed me that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals will soon rule on the Padilla retroactivity issue.  The case is United States v. Marisella Carmen-Iglesias (Case No. 11-12316) from the Southern District of Florida.  I will post the briefs and provide updates as they become available.

UPDATE: the “helpful reader” who alerted me to the Carmen-Iglesias case in the Eleventh Circuit was nice enough to send me the appellate briefs.  The Government’s brief can be found here, the appellant’s/defendant’s here.

Padilla Retroactivity in SCOTUS?

A few months ago, I wrote about the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Morris, limiting the procedural vehicles from which a defendant could launch a postconviction challenge under Padilla.  This decision generated some controversy after lower court judges refused to abide by the Morris court’s ruling and continued to entertain Padilla claims raised in the rather esoteric motions that were at issue in Morris.

Thanks to the SCOTUS blog, we have learned that Morris has appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The questions presented are as follows:

(1) Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively to ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised on collateral review; and

(2) whether Virginia provides adequate postconviction remedies when petitioner and others similarly situated are precluded from vindicating violations of the right to effective assistance of counsel under Padilla.

Morris (the petitioner) is being represented by the law firm, Duane Morris.  The petition can be accessed here.  I will post Virginia’s response as it becomes available.

A Right Without A Remedy: Virginia Supreme Court Limits Reach of Padilla

Ubi jus ibi remedium.  Roughly translated from Latin as: “For every wrong, the law provides a remedy.”  For those with Padilla-style claims, however, look elsewhere.  This is the basic message that was recently handed down by the Supreme Court of Virgina in the cases of Commonwealth v. Morris and Commonwealth v. Chan.  At issue in both these cases were the use by defendants of rather esoteric postconviction procedural vehicles (i.e., writ of error coram vobis and writs of audita querela) to alter their criminal sentences so as to avoid adverse immigration consequences.  In arguing for relief, the defendants in both these cases relied on Padilla v. Kentucky.  The trial courts said yes, but the Virginia Supreme Court said no.

The opinion is available here.

The court first recounted the historical origins of both these procedural vehicles and then went on to find them inappropriate vehicles for achieving the postconviction relief at issue.  The court, instead, pointed to the writ of habeas corpus, as the avenue for asserting a Padilla-like ineffective assistance claim.

The net effect of the court’s ruling here is to limit the ways an attorney in Virginia, and, potentially other states, can successfully and creatively seek postconviction relief for a client whose old criminal background has come back to haunt him in the immigration context.  For these individuals, saying that they should look to a habeas petition for appropriate relief, is like saying they have no relief at all, since many of their convictions would have been entered long before Padilla hit the books and therefore too old to support a timely habeas petition.

In fact, this ruling brings to mind another Latin phrase, the selection of which I owe to the all-encompassing Wikipedia site:  abusus non tollit usum.  Roughly translated as: “misuse does not remove use.”  Put another way: Just because something is misused doesn’t mean it can’t be used correctly.

Collateral No More

The effects of Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky continue to be felt in other areas of criminal procedure law.  In Pridham v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled that postconviction relief would be warranted where an attorney provides “gross misadvice” to a client concerning parole eligibility, relying almost exclusively on Padilla.  In doing so, the Pridham court rejected the notion, advanced by KY authorities, that Padilla only applied to situations involving deportation:

The Commonwealth argues that the unique nature of deportation limits the Padilla decision to only misadvice concerning the risk of deportation. However, the Court in Padilla repeatedly cited with approval to its decision in Hill, a case dealing with the Strickland standards in the context of misadvice regarding parole eligibility. Moreover, the factors relied upon in the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the circumstances of gross misadvice about parole eligibility. Parole eligibility involves a foreseeable, material consequence of the guilty plea that is “intimately related to the criminal process” and is an “automatic result” following certain criminal convictions. Id. at —-, 130 S.Ct. at 1478, 1486. The varying degrees of eligibility enumerated by the General Assembly in KRS 439.3401 are “succinct, clear and explicit.” KRS 439.3401 provides that “any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of ․ [a] Class A felony”․ is considered a “violent offender” for the purposes of the parole statute. KRS 439.3401. The statute further states that, “[a] violent offender who has been convicted of ․ a Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years ․ shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.” KRS 439.3401(3). Even though Pridham’s Class A felony conviction (Manufacturing methamphetamine, 2nd offense) would not be regarded by most as a violent offense, all Class A felonies are treated equally for the purposes of parole eligibility. The parole classification system is automatic upon conviction or guilty plea and permanently affects a defendant’s minimum term of imprisonment.

While not particularly groundbreaking in terms of strengthening the rights of the accused – after all, this is a gross misadvice case – the decision is significant in that its reasoning is based almost entirely on Padilla and its more general, non-deportation related proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is not limited to the confines of a courtroom, thus giving new meaning to the attorney as counselor and advisor.

Harvard Law Review: Padilla and the 2009 Supreme Court Term

By way of the Harvard Law Review, comes an examination of the Supreme Court’s 2009 term, including an analysis of its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.  The excerpt on Padilla can be downloaded here.

Equal Justice Under Law

Photo courtesy of the Brennan Center for Justice

I recently finished reading the biography of Justice William Brennan, considered one of the most influential jurists in United States Supreme Court history.   Brennan is perhaps best known as the liberal bulwark of the Court in a tenure that spanned the reign of three Chief Justices, Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist.

It is no surprise that Brennan’s liberal leanings, exhibited most prominently in his rulings from the Court, made Brennan a much-reviled figure among conservatives, who disliked him as much for his views as for his success in turning those views into law.  These critics complained that Brennan acted beyond his authority as a judge whose role it is to simply apply the law, not make it.  Instead, the criticism goes, Brennan would act as kind of a super-legislature, grafting his personal views of morality and human dignity into his judicial opinions.

Whether these accusations have any basis in fact is perhaps open to dispute.  To be sure, Brennan cannot be considered a judge whose ultimate fidelity lies in the words of a statute instead of in his convictions of right and wrong.  With a properly framed question, Brennan, I am sure, would have admitted as much if he were still alive.  Indeed, a popular story of Brennan’s tenure as Supreme Court justice is that he would invariably ask his clerks who have just come on board for a new term what the most important rule is when it comes to judging on the Supreme Court.  After fielding incorrect answers like “due process” or “equal protection” he would raise up five fingers and say that the most important rule in the Court is to attain votes from five justices in a case, which constitutes a majority on the Court.  Activist? Perhaps.  Result-driven?  Maybe so.

But focusing on such mechanisms of judicial rulemaking do nothing to advance the debate of what we consider to be a model society that is governed by the rule of law rather than one that is run by the whim of the individual.  As Brennan’s “rule of five” vignette demonstrates, judging necessarily involves the employment of policy preferences; after all, if judging was as simple and straightforward as applying the law to the facts, as is the myth most prominently trumpeted perhaps by Chief Justice Roberts (his judge as umpire calling balls and strikes analogy comes to mind), why aren’t all cases before the Court decided on a unanimous basis? And this is true whether the judge is considering the case of a derelict landlord who fails to fix a tenant’s leaky faucet or one involving more weighty constitutional issues like whether the government can prohibit flag-burning consistent with the First Amendment (it cannot).  There are exceptions to this phenomenon, of course, but the simple truth is that judges are most of the time lawmakers, only in different garb.

I would argue that the sooner we recognize and accept this, the sooner we can move on to more substantive discussions as to which judge-made laws, and the principles which underlie them, are more consistent with what we view as a just and equal society.  Fortunately, Brennan got past this a long time ago and, as a consequence, achieved unparalleled success in changing the direction of this country through his rulings, one that sought to recognize and protect the dignity of the individual above all else.

Perez: Padilla Creates a “New Rule”, Not Retroactive

A U.S. District Court from Nebraska has ruled that principle announced in Padilla v. Kentucky – i.e., effective assistance requires advice as to immigration consequences – creates a “new rule” under the standard established in Teague v. Lane and is therefore barred from retroactive application.  The case is United States v. Perez, Case No. 8:02CR296 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) and can be accessed here.  From the opinion in Perez:

A decision of the Supreme Court should not be applied retroactively if it creates a “new rule” which “`breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government . . . . To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Miller v. Lochhart, 65 F.3d 676, 685 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). In 2006, when Perez pled guilty to his single-count indictment, failure to inform a defendant of the prospect of deportation did not necessarily constitute an error of counsel in the Eighth Circuit. See Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2001). Thus, this Court is convinced that Padilla created a “new rule” that should not apply retroactively because such rule was not dictated in prior Eighth Circuit precedent. Moreover, with the holding in Gumangan, at the time of Perez’s plea, it was not clear that it was a “prevailing professional norm” in the Eighth Circuit to inform a defendant of immigration consequences when pleading guilty. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if this Court were to apply Padilla retroactively, it is unclear how it would do so in light of Gumangan.

Even without having  researched it, I would take issue with the analysis of the Perez court.  It matters not what the  prevailing norms were in the Eighth Circuit at the time of the conduct at issue in Perez.  In issuing the Padilla decision, the Supreme Court had already put this issue to bed, concluding that the prevailing professional norms nationally, i.e., among all circuits, required a criminal defense attorney to advise as to immigration consequences.  I would also argue that whether the prevailing professional norms in the Eighth Circuit required advice as to immigration consequences is an issue separate and apart from the issue of whether Padilla was dictated by existing precedent.  The undeniable fact is that Padilla was decided squarely on the basis of Strickland v. Washington, certainly a case that was on the books at the time Padilla was decided.

New Paper on Padilla Retroactivity

Courtesy of Doug Berman over at Sentencing Law and Policy: Gray Proctor and criminal procedure guru, Nancy King, have jointly authored an article entitled Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal Courts.  The article can be accessed here.

From the preamble:

This article addresses questions that may face courts as defendants seek relief under the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that counsel’s failure to adequately inform the defendant of the deportation consequences of conviction constituted deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment. Issues addressed include: express waivers of review in plea agreements; what constitutes deficient advice and prejudice sufficient for a finding of ineffective assistance; the retroactive application of Padilla to cases on post-conviction review; federal habeas review of state court decisions rejecting Padilla-type claims; procedural default, successive petition, and time bars to federal habeas review of Padilla claims; and other collateral relief. This draft includes citations to emerging case authority available as of October 28, 2010.

More Padilla Retroactivity

I have been researching Padilla-related caselaw for an upcoming CLE presentation and came across another decision in which Padilla is found to have no retroactivity bar.  The case is Martin v. United States, Case No. 09-1387 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010) and the judge in Michael Mihm.  The decision can be accessed here via Google Scholar.

From Martin:

[A]t the time Martin plead guilty and was sentenced, Santos and George remained binding upon the issue of whether counsel’s alleged failure to inform a defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government contends that Padilla v. Kentucky announced a new rule of criminal procedure that does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989) (stating that “[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality . . .” and holding that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to cases on collateral review which have become final before the new rules are announced”).

A “new rule” under Teague is one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990). In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court considered the first prong of Strickland and discussed how prevailing professional norms suggest that counsel advise their clients of the possible deportation risks following a guilty plea. 130 S.Ct. at 1482. The Supreme Court also rejected the position that its holding should be limited to affirmative misadvice of counsel, noting that it is the “critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of `the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.’” Id. at 1484 (citing Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51 (1995)). The Padilla case likely did not break new ground or impose new obligations given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on Strickland, prevailing professional norms, and the “long recognized” importance of the plea negotiation phase. Id. at 1482-86; see also Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Teague presented no problem in a case where the defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel for a Vienna Convention Article 36 violation because “counsel’s duty to know the applicable law, at least when it matters to his client’s defense, has been clearly established by Strickland and its progeny”). Padilla v. Kentucky therefore applies to Martin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsel’s alleged failure to fully inform him of the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea.

As you can see, for whatever reason, the Martin court’s retroactivity analysis is rather limited.  Nevertheless, it makes clear that Padilla did not create a new rule and therefore is applicable to final convictions which predated the date of the Padilla decision.

Now can someone explain to me how to square this holding with the one in Shafeek?!  See my prior blog post for more details.

Padilla Retroactivity Confusion

From the Eastern District of Michigan comes a decision by Judge Denise Hood finding that Padilla cannot be applied retroactively.  The case is United States v. Shafeek, Criminal Case No. 05-81129, Civil Case No. No. 10-12670 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010).  Opinion courtesy of Google Scholar here.

The wrinkle, however, is that she reaches this conclusion despite having concluded in the same decision that the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla did NOT announce a “new rule” for retroactivity purposes.  From the Shafeek decision:

Given the Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla, it appears that the rule announced is not a “new rule” regarding a defense counsel’s duty to, at the minium, advise a client of a risk of adverse immigration consequences. The Padilla decision turned on the fact that the defense counsel could have easily determined from reading the removal statute that defendant’s deportation “was presumptively mandatory” and that his counsel’s advice to the contrary was incorrect. Id. Because the Padilla opinion may not be considered a “new rule,” Shafeek cannot show that the Padilla opinion should be applied retroactively.

Huh?  It has been my understanding that under the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Teague v. Lane on retroactivity in cases pending on collateral review, only “new rules” are barred from retroactive application unless they fall within one of two exceptions.  The upshot, of course, is that rules that are not considered “new” under the Teague analysis should be applied retroactively.  Such was the conclusion by the court in Chaidez which concluded, correctly in my opinion, that because Padilla was not a “new rule” it could be applied retroactively.  See United States v. Chaidez (“Accordingly, the court holds that Padilla did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes and affirms its earlier opinion that no retroactivity problem is raised by petitioner’s claim”).

Am I missing something here?